Aristotle’s theory of politikē archē dovetails with the principle of equality in two distinct ways. Firstly, unlike the despotikē archē that presupposes the natural division between the ruler [archōn] and the ruled [archomenos], his politikē archē presumes a ruling shared by the free and the equal who take the role of archōn and archomenos in turn. Secondly, although commonly perceived distinctions between different people (such as degrees of wealth) should not be allowed to override their equal position under the principle of equality, the very principle should not, conversely, be radicalized to the point where it obliterates natural differences. For Aristotle, the true form of equality is to treat equal persons and things equally and unequal ones unequally. This Aristotelian notion of equity under a just rule of law—which proffers a multi-faceted and flexible understanding of equality—is highly relevant today. How can we provide differential treatment—in the form of benefits, accommodations, or exemptions—to different individuals without compromising the basic equality of all citizens? When is such differential treatment justified, and when does it serve as a basis to rationalize or naturalize discrimination? In this paper, I examine Aristotle’s theory of politikē archē in comparison to John Rawls’s discussion of propertyowning democracy, arguing that both require adequate economic resources and a sense of self-respect in order for individual citizens with distinct differences to be able to engage in ways of life that others see as worthwhile, and therefore to be respected as civic and social equals. Aristotle’s theory of politikē archē dovetails with the principle of equality in two distinct ways. Firstly, unlike the despotikē archē that presupposes the natural division between the ruler [archōn] and the ruled [archomenos], his politikē archē presumes a ruling shared by the free and the equal who take the role of archōn and archomenos in turn. Secondly, although commonly perceived distinctions between different people (such as degrees of wealth) should not be allowed to override their equal position under the principle of equality, the very principle should not, conversely, be radicalized to the point where it obliterates natural differences. For Aristotle, the true form of equality is to treat equal persons and things equally and unequal ones unequally. This Aristotelian notion of equity under a just rule of law—which proffers a multi-faceted and flexible understanding of equality—is highly relevant today. How can we provide differential treatment—in the form of benefits, accommodations, or exemptions—to different individuals without compromising the basic equality of all citizens? When is such differential treatment justified, and when does it serve as a basis to rationalize or naturalize discrimination? In this paper, I examine Aristotle’s theory of politikē archē in comparison to John Rawls’s discussion of property-owning democracy, arguing that both require adequate economic resources and a sense of self-respect in order for individual citizens with distinct differences to be able to engage in ways of life that others see as worthwhile, and therefore to be respected as civic and social equals.