We invite presentations that are interested in how theories of legal reasoning, interpretation and argumentation relate to legal practice and to empirical studies of human reasoning and decision-making in general. The idea in this workshop is to discuss theorizing on legal reasoning based on how judges reason in reality (understood broadly to include legal interpretation, argumentation and decision-making). More precisely, we are interested in whether the theories of legal reasoning and interpretation give a realistic or distorted picture of the practice of legal decision-making and to what extent they should fit with each other. In other words, instead of seeing theories of legal reasoning only as providing a normative yardstick to which practice should conform, could the actual practices of legal interpretation and decision-making contribute to legal theory-building? Furthermore, how can insights from empirical sciences, such as cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, inform legal theories on reasoning and decision-making? The presentations can deal with e.g., the following questions:

• To what extent must there be a ‘fit’ between legal theory and practice?
• To what extent should normative theory of legal reasoning and decision-making be adjusted when decision makers’ behavior deviates from theory?
• To what extent are empirical sciences or scientific discoveries about human reasoning and decision-making relevant to theories of legal reasoning?

Abstracts (about 300 words) should be sent to the convenors of the workshop by 15th March. We will notify the participants about the acceptance of abstracts by 3rd April.