Presenters: Massimo Renzo, Suzy Killmister, Steven Wall
Autonomy is a central concept in contemporary moral and political philosophy. It figures prominently in discussions of free will and responsibility, moral worth and dignity, respect for persons, accounts of good or successful lives, and the limits of practical authority. Not surprisingly, there is in the philosophical literature a plurality of rival articulations of the concept of autonomy, and its content, nature and evaluative significance are hotly disputed. Despite these areas of contention, there is general agreement that autonomy involves a type of valuable self-rule or self-determination. Roughly speaking, we are autonomous when we direct our lives in light of our own understanding of what is worth doing and when we take responsibility for our actions. Autonomous agents rule themselves and are not ruled by alien forces. The papers in this panel explore some of the conditions for autonomous agency so understood.
The conditions of autonomous agency are complex and various. They can be helpfully sorted into internal or psychological conditions, on the one hand, and external or environmental conditions, on the other. To be a self-determining agent one must have an evaluative outlook that guides one’s responses to the world. Characterizing the nature of this evaluative outlook has been an important issue for those interested in autonomy. Does it involve higher-level endorsement of lower-level preferences, or does it require evaluative judgment in a more robust sense? Does such an outlook require consistency and coherence across time, or can one be autonomous if one’s basic values and concerns continually change in response to changing circumstances? Does an autonomous outlook require critical reflection, or can one be autonomous if one leads a relatively unreflective life? These questions and others concern the internal conditions of autonomous agency.
Accurately specified, the internal conditions may suffice for autonomous agency. But many have thought that autonomy has a social or relational dimension as well. Manipulation and coercion from others in particular have been thought to threaten autonomy. We are not autonomous, or our autonomy is significantly diminished, when we are subject to the will of others, or so it is often claimed. Manipulation can be direct, as when a scientist implants a chip in one’s brain, or indirect, as when one’s preferences and values are shaped in objectionable ways by the oppressive and unjust social conditions in which one finds oneself.
Manipulation and coercion implicate external or environmental conditions. But might there be more to an autonomy conducive environment than the absence of objectionable manipulative and coercive influence? Again, many have thought so. If we have no real opportunities of choice, then our autonomy is undermined or diminished, even if no one has manipulated or coerced us. But, if so, what range of choice is needed, and why does autonomy require actual as opposed to merely perceived options?
The papers in this panel address these questions from different angles and with different concerns in mind. They share an interest in understanding the relation between the internal and external conditions of autonomous agency, and they share a conviction that there is a relatively unified concept of autonomy that can be illuminated by considering the role it plays in a range of theoretical contexts from agency and responsibility to moral and political concerns.