Home - IVR 2024
Panpsychism as alternative moral language
Convenors
Akihiko Morita (Shokei Gakuin University, Japan) fwge1820@gmail.com
The humanistic view that "human beings are equal in dignity and rights" is a fundamental value of the postwar world, symbolized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and is also the basis of "human rights," which is now a universal normative concept.
However, this view of humanity is different from "exclusive humanism," which holds that "only human beings have value as ends, not as means. This latter absolute humanism is beginning to be challenged by indigenous human rights activists seeking recognition of the rights of nature, including animal rights, as well as by the tremendous development of artificial intelligence in recent years.
If the privileged status of humanity over other species, nature in the broadest sense, and artificial intelligence (life) cannot be justified unconditionally, the question must be asked, "What is a possible conception of a theory of rights that does not privilege human beings but also adequately guarantees their rights (including human rights)?
Susumu Morimura, Professor Emeritus/Hitotsubashi University, also stated, "If we take the interest theory of rights, we can defend the rights of animals as individuals, but it is still impossible to recognize the rights of future generations, animals as species, and the natural environment," and concluded that this requires "a perspective that is not anthropocentric at all”, which is different from both human rights theory and communitarianism.
In response to this question, I propose a panpsychist theory of rights as an alternative. It argues that "every entity, including human beings, has a mind or mind-like qualities, and that they become subjects of rights according to their level of mind and social and legal recognition in each historical and social context.
To avoid misunderstandings of modern panpsychism, I quote Skrbina, who distinguishes between "mind", "awareness", "consciousness", and "cognition/self-awareness". He explains that "mind" is inherent in all entities, and "awareness" is inherent in all living things; he defines "consciousness" as inherent in all animals, and "cognition/self-awareness" as inherent in humans and similar higher animals. According to Skrbina's definition, the fact that all entities have minds or mind-like qualities does not mean that all entities are aware, conscious, or aware of their minds. The most common critical question posed to panpsychism is "Do rocks have human-like consciousness? According to Skrbina, this is a simple logical fallacy.
If we assume that all entities have mind-like qualities, then the natural environment and ecosystems must also have some mind-like qualities. Therefore, to express this in terms of legal phenomena: "All entities have a mind or mind-like qualities, and when the relationship between them (non-human entities) and human beings develops and a situation arises that requires a legal solution, and when human understanding reaches a level that can deal with such a situation, each entity becomes a subject of rights and has specific rights. In other words, when human understanding reaches a level that can correspond to such situations, each object becomes a subject of rights and possesses specific rights.
My tentative suggestion is that modern scientific panpsychism could be one of the alternative ideas that provides a plausible perspective for conceiving such a non-anthropocentric view.