1. Dsouza, Mark
“The case for a normative theory of pro tanto criminal proscription”

Criminalization theories frequently claim to be providing a normative account of when it is appropriate to use the substantive criminal law to shrink of our presumptive initial liberty. Standardly, they parse this project as requiring them to answer the question, ‘For what sorts of conduct may the state criminally convict a person?’. I argue here that this is a misstep. While there is value in theorising appropriate ‘convictability’, the substantive criminal law’s coercive liberty-limiting power is already asserted well before conviction, when a pro tanto offence is identified. Only a normative theory of pro tanto criminal proscription can offer us a normative account of the use of the substantive criminal law to limit liberty. Such an account also highlights alternative and underexplored ways of thinking about the structure of the criminal law, and suggests avenues for making progress on persistent disagreements within the criminalization literature.

2. Ahn, Seong Jo,
“Reinterpreting Criminal Law’s Foremost Principles from a Rawlsian Perspective”

Although the foremost principles as limits of criminal law are the most important topic in the modern criminal law theory, we still have few theoretically robust grounds that could justify and explain coherently the foremost principles and thus make the principles have more stable status than other principles or policies, so the reasonable justificatory grounds that have explanatory power should and could be explored deeply from the liberal perspective of legal and political philosophy. I would like to address and propose the pure procedural justification of the principles that could be called ‘contractarian justification of law’ mainly based on J. Rawls’s ideas and show that how the methodology could make it for the purpose.

3. Kim, Hak jin.
"On Matters with Recognition of Normality and Normativity in the New Normal after Pandemic"

Over the past three years, the unprecedented pandemic has exposed us to experience the societal impact of government-led, no-exceptions emergency measures. The need to think about the meaning of 'normality' as a justification for emergency measures, and also as a reference point for the formulation, application, and interpretation of public law in times of emergency, has increased. Carl Schmitt had already stated his perspective on emergency (the state of exception) and normality. It is no coincidence that his name keeps coming up during the emergency and beyond. This text is going to examine the question of normality in our time, centered on a critical review of Carl Schmitt's perspective.

4. Lee, Minyoul
"Extensional and Intensional Equivalence Analysis of Legal Propositions as a Necessary Preliminary Work of Constitutional Review"

In this presentation, I will argue that intensional and extensional equivalence analysis of legal norms should be included as one of the essential preliminary tasks of constitutional review. I will examine the typical methods of each analysis and the important role they play. Application of these methods shall reveal important preliminary issue when dealing with constitutional case.
“Intension” indicates the internal content of a term or concept that constitutes its formal definition; and “extension” indicates its range of applicability by naming the particular objects that it denotes. Propositional functions that are intensionally equivalent are those in which the expression of any one propositional function can change the expressions of other propositional functions without changing their contents. Propositional functions that are extensionally equivalent are those in which the set of all pairs of objects put into variable and truth values of the function within specified range of worlds is same.
Examining intensional equivalence relations perform useful role in uncovering linguistic deception; enforce principled thinking; reveals the need for substantive empirical and normative arguments that may be obscured by incorrect assumptions implicitly introduced.
Examining extensional equivalence relations shows that in the realm of constitutional arguments if extension of A and B are equivalent, extension of A cannot be justified unless the requirements that must be met for the extension of B to be justified are actually met.